To analyse convergence and divergence in Natural Resource New Governance Arrangements (NRNGAs) two regimes in the environmentally-related areas of forest and fisheries management are examined. The findings reveal limited convergence across sectors and countries in the general aims and ideas behind NGAs and evidence of significant policy divergence in the tools and mechanisms created for their implementation. The reasons for the differences lie primarily in the policy formulation process. While the impetus for the adoption of both NRNGAs is in the international and regional realms, without the force of either international law or competitive advantage, pressure for convergence is weak. Aspects of the policy formulation process, especially the manner in which the changing capacities of domestic public and private actors active in the affected resource policy arena interact to influence policy design, are critical for explaining policy convergence and divergence. Specifically, the interplay between the effect of the internationalization of resource policy issues, tending to increase private capacities at the expense of the public one, and the declining importance of primary industries, which has the reverse effect, is shown to have played an important role in NRNGA policy dynamics.
and that significant patterns of convergence and divergence can be seen in this area as well (OECD ; Pollitt a and b). In this article, we address a specific type of relatively novel governance arrangementwhat we term ' Natural Resource New Governance Arrangements' (NRNGAs) -which combine new policy goals, objectives, instruments and settings in what is intended to be a ' co-ordinated' and ' cohesive' way (Briassoulis ; Lafferty and Hovden ) . We examine two cases of the development of these regimes in the environmentally-related areas of forest and coastal zone management. We set out the elements of these regimes in both theoretical and practical terms, and then turn to the analysis of their development in Europe.
Our conclusions are significant beyond the natural resource area, since these NRNGAs are examples of a larger class of integrated strategies now found in many sectors, from healthcare to risk management (Stead, Geerlings and Meijers ) . The question of their origin and diffusion is now of interest both in terms of what this tells us about policy convergence and divergence generally, but also about how this new class of governance strategies has evolved and changed from design to implementation (Eliadis, Hill and Howlett ) .
Our findings reveal significant similarities across sectors and countries and a general pattern of convergence towards NRNGAs as a domestic response to international calls for more integrated approaches to resource and environmental management strategies, largely developed and promoted by professional networks. However the detailed assessment of the European NRNGAs reveal little evidence of any larger pattern of policy convergence in terms of policy objectives, instruments and settings.

Without the force of either international law or competitive advantage, consequential pressure for adoption of similar implementation structures and mechanisms is weak. Thus, we propose that the reasons for the differences in NRNGAs, and more generally in NGAs, lie in the different requisites of the weak international regimes in which each is embedded, coupled with the different configuration of domestic actors and capacities found in each jurisdiction. Specifically, the pattern of actual adoptions of different types of NRNGAs can be shown to have been caused by the interplay between the effect of the internationalization of resource policy issues, tending to increase private capacities at the expense of the public one, and the declining importance of primary industries, which has had the reverse effect upon NRNGA design and content.
New governance arrangements in theory and practice
Many existing policy regimes developed incrementally in an ad hoc fashion over relatively long periods of time (Eisner ; Esping-Andersen ; Orren and Skowronek -). These regimes sometimes contained a unifying overall ' governance strategy' or logic, but more often contain instances of policy instrument use and programmes stacked on top of each other in a process of policy ' layering', or incrementally developed through processes of ' policy drift' or ' conversion' (Beland and Hacker ; Hacker ) . In a process of policy drift, instruments are altered in an existing mix in the effort to adapt to changing circumstances, leading to a gap between means and principles of policies (Hacker n.d) . Over long periods of time, layering usually results in the development of a regime that is costly to administer, often contains counter-productive instrument mixes, but is very difficult to change since key elements confer benefits on well-entrenched interests who over time attain veto or quasi-veto powers (de Moor ; Myers and Kent ; Harris and Milkis ). In the case of conversion, an existing, successful mix of policy instruments is redirected to the achievement of new policy goals, introducing conflict and incoherence into the original set of policy objectives (Falkenmark ) . However, as the situation and capacities of national governments and the scale and scope of policy problems have been altered over the past several decades, the desire to develop less contradictory and more carefully designed, ' smart' or ' co-ordinated' governance arrangements has come to the fore (Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair ; Metcalfe ) (see Figure ) .
New policy initiatives dealing with issues ranging from pollution control to international security and trade increasingly involve the use of consciously designed policy mixes located in ' next-generation' ' New Governance Arrangements' (NGAs), or strategies (Eberlein and Kerwer ; Loughlin ; Rhodes ). These novel modes of governance differ from existing policy mixes in three main ways. First, they are specifically designed to reduce the number of counter-productive policy instruments often found in existing policy mixes (Grabosky ) . Second, they are designed to function effectively and meet public policy F . Typology of integrated strategies according to relationships with existing policies goals in a globalized era of generally decreased national state capacity or autonomy (Milward and Provan ; Howlett  and ; Howlett and Ramesh ; Rhodes ). Finally, they rely more heavily on the involvement of private actors in both policy formulation and implementation than do earlier strategies.

NGAs combine policy instruments (often of a fairly traditional or well-known type) and their settings in new ways, with the intention that multiple instruments support rather than undermine one another in the pursuit of multiple policy goals and objectives. NGAs usually attempt to integrate existing, and sometimes, rival policy initiatives into a more cohesive strategy (May et al. ) , to coordinate the activities of multiple agencies and actors (Peters ) and, generally, to substitute a holistic approach for one that has decomposed policy into a set of multiple and apparently unrelated problems and solutions (Eliadis, Hill and Howlett ) .
These schemes differ from ' old' governance arrangements both in their origins and intent. That is, integrated strategies can be seen as a particular type of governance arrangement in which conscious design has attempted to overcome the limitations on policy effectiveness caused by layering, drift and conversion.
Assessing convergence and divergence in NRNGAs
NGAs exist in many policy areas, including ' safety cultures' in traffic and transportation policy, recent proposals for social security reform in the US, and new health arrangements focusing on wellness (Schout and Jordan ; May et al. , ; Power and McCarty ; Ashley and Maxwell ; Lock ). All of these NGAs attempt to replace older patterns and modes of governance with new strategies in which policy goals and means are seen as being more integrated and capable of more optimal results than regimes developed through layering, draft and conversion. A plethora of self-styled NGAs now exist in the area of resource and environmental policy (Jordan, Wurzel and Zito  and ; Briassoulis ) .
In the natural resource and environmental sector, NRNGAs all feature certain common elements that serve to structure instrument choice (Glueck , Stead, Geerlings and Meijers ) . While the sustainability idea currently provides a loose conceptual frame for most contemporary NRNGAs, the actual development of resource policies continues to be marked by theoretical conflict and disagreement between a number of competing paradigms in the physical and social sciences. Such conflict impedes the development of common problem definitions, continuing the currency of older, sectoral approaches to policy problems, and reducing the scope of policy learning with respect to instruments and settings (Briassoulis b: ) . In these circumstances, many contemporary NRNGAs have focused on the use of innovative procedural instruments in the belief that promoting dialogue and a pluralistic approach to competing theoretical paradigms offers a way forward.
Thus, NRNGAs typically use a variety of procedural instruments such as the creation of advisory committees, mediation and arbitration provisions, and interest group facilitation which can be either formalthat is, set out and established in legal and regulatory frameworks -or more informal in nature. However, the danger of an exclusive focus on procedural instruments is clear: the process itself may come to take precedence over the production of substantive policy outputs, either as a deliberate attempt to legitimize the status quo while engaging the various interests in a time-consuming ' dialogue' or as the unintended consequence of a mismanaged and ill-designed process. Thus, most NRNGAs are also characterized by a continuing search for appropriate coordination and policy learning mechanisms involving various forms of cross-sectoral environmental or industrial planning activities, taking into account additional resource and environmental considerations. These efforts can themselves remain largely symbolic, that is, relegated to overall policy statements and general design principles where no change in inputs is intended -or can be substantive in nature, that is, involving the establishment of new institutional forms such as multi-sectoral bodies and other new implementation agencies. The four ideal typical NRNGAs that result are set out in Figure  .
These new contemporary policy designs require careful analysis in order to understand where, when and why such designs have been F . Types of Natural Resource New Governance Arrangements adopted and, more importantly, under which circumstances they have proven effective, in the sense of generating new substantive outputs. While all these questions are closely linked with each other -the nature of the policy problems, their ' tractability' to an integrated approach, the potential for interdisciplinary conceptualizations of the problems that go beyond the rhetoric of sustainability, etc., are all key components of success and failure -in what follows, we focus on the ' why' question. The reasons for the adoption of NRNGAs are not well known and our goal is to identify the conditions under which different types of NRNGAs emerge and understand any common patterns of evolution -convergent or divergent -which can be observed in their appearance.
Our examples of NRNGAs are recent European efforts to create National Forest Programmes (NFPs) and to implement Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM). Taken together, they provide a useful set of comparative cases for assessing the use of contemporary governance strategies in resource and environmental policy. The cases chosen provide a good sample from among developed countries, and forestry and coastal zone management are both important natural resource policy areas in and of themselves. The overall aim of the paper therefore is to outline NRNGA developments in Integrated Coastal Zone Management and forestry policy in recent years, and create plausible and supportable hypotheses and evidence to describe and explain convergences and divergences for developed countries in these two policy areas, with the expectation that the lessons learned in these cases can be extrapolated to other instances of NGA development.
National Forest Programmes and Integrated Coastal Zone Management as New Natural Resource Governance Arrangements Origins in the international sphere
In their present form, both NFPs and ICZM are relatively recent innovations. Both can trace their origins back to the ' planning orientation' of the late s and early s. The US has a pioneering Integrated Coastal Zone Management federal framework law, the Coastal Zone Management Act, enacted in . However, most current versions date from the late s when the trend towards better policy coordination began and both initiatives received considerable impetus from international deliberations by expert networks on policies to promote sustainable development. NFPs grew out of the Tropical Forest Action Plans (TFAPs) that donor nations and international organizations proposed to improve forest management in developing countries. While TFAPs rapidly fell out of favour with international organizations when evaluations drew attention to their lack of impact on the ground, the larger concept of developing coordinated national forest sector strategies found its way into the deliberations of UNCED in  and into the forests chapter of Agenda  (Liss ). The recommendation that emerged from Rio -that all countries use an internationally agreed-upon form of strategic coordination to promote sustainable forest managementproved a useful point of agreement between all parties involved in the subsequent attempt to negotiate an international forest convention or treaty. It implied an acknowledgement that improvements in forest management needed to be made in the developed world as much as in the tropics (Humphreys  and ) .
ICZM was also a favourite planning tool of the international development community, especially where the hard currency development projects favoured by many international organizations, such as shrimp aquaculture or international tourism, threatened local access rights and endangered fragile coastal ecosystems. Once again, Agenda  pushed the instrument forward by emphasizing a general commitment on the part of nations to pursue integrated management of coastal areas and the marine environment, together with a specific call for the development of an Integrated Coastal Zone Management framework and guidelines. Although the OECD was also actively promoting ICZM at this time, the World Bank took the lead and their Guidelines were adopted at the  World Coast Conference in Noordwijk, Holland. The development of National Forest Policies was more tortuous, pushed forward as negotiations towards an international convention on forest conservation and management stalled. The Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) which emerged from Rio was succeeded by the International Forum on Forests (IFF) and, at length, by the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) without agreement on a legallybinding convention. However, the IPF/IFF process produced an ' Action Plan' which, though non-binding, was particularly influential. It contained, among other items, a section on attaining ' progress through national forest and land-use programmes' where countries were exhorted to ' (d)evelop and implement a holistic national forest programme which integrates the conservation and sustainable use of forest resources and benefits in a way that is consistent with national, sub-national and local policies and strategies' (IPF Proposal for Action ). National NFPs are the result.
Adoption and diffusion pattern of European ICZM and NFP initiatives
The European pattern of convergence on Integrated Coastal Zone Management and National Forest Policies as natural resource new governance arrangements is very similar. In both cases, there was considerable experimentation with new instrument mixes on the one hand and strategic approaches on the other, before the two were combined into something recognizable as a natural resource NGA. This creates a considerable initial difficulty in tracking policy convergence, as many countries used the terms ' ICZM' and ' NFP' before there was any general agreement on their meaning. In general, ' Integrated Coastal Zone Management' tended to be used to describe particular planning initiatives for coastal areas that tried to address local coordination problems without taking a broadly integrative approach; on the other hand, ' National Forest Policies' was sometimes used to describe large scale national strategies for the forest sector that responded to, or even attempted to anticipate, Agenda , with few, if any, substantive outputs. In terms of Figure  , it can be noted as a preliminary observation that these early origins posed distinctive threats to the attempt to create NRNGAs. In the case of NFPs, the danger is that NFPs will remain purely rhetorical. In the case of ICZM, the danger is that the formal processes of intersectoral coordination at various spatial levels will become ' talking shops' that fail to deliver substantive outputs beyond a diminishing commitment to further dialogue.
The progress of ICZM initiatives in Europe is particularly difficult to track because this expert disagreement about what constitutes strategic integrated coastal zone management continues. Many jurisdictions have engaged in coastal zone planning and management for decades without necessarily reaching the degree of integration that would identify their efforts as an example of a NGA. This is by no means a specifically European problem. Even the apparently clear cut situation in the US, where  out of  eligible states and territories are currently in compliance with the  Act and receiving federal funding, is open to objections of this kind. The US federal authorities have made significant efforts to bring the CZMA up to date with post-UNCED developments resulting in the Oceans Act of  and the  Oceans Action Plan.
In Europe, Integrated Coastal Zone Management began largely at the project level. A  study of EU coastal states plus Norway found the following uneven pattern of ICZM implementation ( Figure ) ; distinguishing between plans that were fully implemented, those merely formulated, and those under development in the pre-formulation stage.
While this figure does show the uneven development of European ICZM, it may also overstate any trend towards achievement of a general pattern of Integrated Coastal Zone Management adoption. Of  coastal regions studied,  were recorded as showing no progress in ICZM at all, and only Denmark and the Netherlands had all coastal regions showing at least some progress towards fully formulated or implemented strategies (Salman et al ) .
As an attempt at crafting a NRNGA, rather than as a local planning tool, ICZM in Europe dates from the latter half of the s, after the Oceans chapter of Agenda  had given new direction to existing coastal management efforts. Significant progress had already been made in the plans put in place under the aegis of the UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan. Others were created or revitalized by an EU Demonstration Programme that provided funding for a number of projects and, equally important, for evaluation of the outputs. Still others were the outcome of regional cooperation in shared coastal waters such as the Baltic, the Wadden Sea and the North Sea. In the Netherlands, for obvious reasons a leader in the field, an interdepartmental discussion paper in  produced policy commitments in . In the UK, another leader, the  Seas of Change consultation was followed in  by the EU's first (and so far only) ICZM ' stocktaking' and a commitment to provide legislative authority for ICZM in the next parliament. Ireland produced a Draft Policy on CZM in  but the Bantry Bay process, though generally agreed to be one of the more successful products of the EU Demonstration Programme, remains a relatively isolated example.
The stubborn persistence of ICZM as a local planning tool rather than a true NGA has not gone unnoticed: ' (the) characterization of ICZM in Europe, whereby ICZM is seen as emerging in rather isolated pockets as a response to local situations and in the absence of or without connection F . Integrated Coastal Zone Management  to institutional arrangements at more central levels of government has much in common with community based coastal management scenarios described for tropical developing countries' (Humphreys and Burbridge ) . This situation seems ripe for the kind of Europeanization initiative where the Commission bypasses national governments and joins up the dots to create a European ICZM policy. Instead, however, the debate over ICZM featured a confrontation between European Parliament and the Council, with the emergence of the full array of national sectoral interests opposed to what they saw as unnecessary disturbance of existing local arrangements. The outcome was only a Recommendation on ICZM (//EC) rather than the Directive that many in the Parliament and the NGO community were originally seeking (McKenna, no date). Although coordination is to be carried out by an ambitious benchmarking scheme to identify leaders and laggards, a characteristic NGA instrument, the scheme has yet to be put in place, in part because of continuing disagreement over what is to be measured. For the moment, European level coordination will in fact be carried out by the interaction of the Habitats and Water Quality Framework Directives in different national contexts (Janssen ).
Thus, a recent survey of the achievements and intentions of nineteen European countries with respect to the Recommendation on Integrated Coastal Zone Management, showed only nine intending to develop a national strategy by , the target date set in the Recommendation, six not intending to meet this deadline and four not reporting (see Figure ) . The Netherlands, a leader in ICZM projects, is among the countries not intending to develop a national strategy. More significantly, in answer to the question of when strategic activities began, almost all identified these activities as a response to the Recommendation rather than predating it and almost all of the ' pioneering' activity is of a kind that is not compatible with the strategic direction set out in the Recommendation.
In the European NFP case, a number of distinct features stand out although, overall, the pattern of adoptions of this NGA initiative is quite similar to that of ICZM. Initial survey data on the genesis of NFPs F . Self-reported start of strategic ICZM activity showed three distinct temporal periods of activity ( Figure ) . First, there is a group of countries whose NFP experience appears to begin in the early 's, presumably in the run up to or immediate aftermath of UNCED. Second, the largest group of countries begin their process in the second half of the 's, with a more complex dynamic at work. For the moment, we note that these are mainly northern European countries, with the outlying exceptions of Spain and Ireland. There is a third group that delayed the start of the process, again forming a geographical cluster of Switzerland, Austria and Hungary, with the outlying addition of Greece. Finally, there are the ' holdouts', those countries that have not pursued NFPs, usually because they consider some aspect, or even the whole of their national forest policy as ' equivalent' to an NFP. Notable examples of such countries are Sweden, France and the Netherlands (Zimmerman and Mauderli ).
Such a pattern of policy adoptions suggests some processes of policy learning, emulation or diffusion might be at work; that is, one in which some countries have emerged as leaders in the field, while others, for various reasons, lagged behind in an overall process of lagged policy convergence (Bennett ) . A closer examination of the current status of formal NFPs and adding countries not included in the original survey, however, shows a slightly different picture. Rather than being leaders in the field, as in the ICZM case, the first group clearly represented something of a false dawn. At the time of writing, the United Kingdom has developed a strategy which is an ' output-oriented NFP', and the Czech Republic, Belgium (Flanders) and Lithuania date their current NFP processes to new starts in the late 's (Country Drafts, no date) rather than to the processes that begin in the earlier period. As Schanz shows, most European countries claimed to have some strategic direction in their forest policy prior to the elaboration of the NFP concept, so we have to take special care in determining what are NFP processes and what are policy legacies in this area (Schanz ).
Similar considerations apply when we look at the second group, those who claim to have begun their NFP processes in the second half of the 's. Finland, Denmark, Belgium (Flanders) and Germany began (and F . Self-reported dates for the origins of NFP processes in selected European countries in Finland's case, moved quickly to conclude) formal NFPs in this period that were distinctly different from the looser ' strategies' or ' programmes' already in place in those jurisdictions (Elsasser and Pretzsch ; Hanninen, Ollonqvist and Saastamoinen ). In Spain's case, the process was more complex than it initially appeared, with a more informal strategy leading to the development of regional forest plans and ultimately a Spanish Forest Programme. In Norway's case, too, it is the current round of changes to Norway's forest legislation that is being presented as an NFP, placing Norway as a late addition to the next group (National Report to the Third Session of the United Nations Forum on Forests, do date; Gulbrandsen ).
The third group is now a little clearer and consists of countries that appeared to have delayed the start of formal NFP processes but are the most likely candidates for demonstrating policy convergence, namely Austria, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Portugal, to which may now be added France (). These countries have clearly been motivated by the ' bandwagon effect' of NFP adoption by the second group and by the formal adoption of NFPs by the EU, including the reference to NFPs in the rural development funding directive. As yet, however, it is much too soon to determine whether a European convergence will take place. And the fourth group, the hold outs, can now be seen as a substantial and heterogeneous group of countries including, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. While the latter group's forest policies show varying degrees of strategic direction and sophistication, it is clear that they have, for whatever, reason, not yet joined the movement towards the use of NFP's as a general tool of network governance and policy coordination.
Most important of all, the formal adoption of a NFP, like an ICZM, tells us nothing about the extent to which a country has actually managed to produce substantively altered policy outputs as a result. A great deal of scepticism has been expressed on this score in both cases. European NFPs have been criticized for perpetuating the dominance of traditional forest sector interests and failing to attract political commitment from governments (Papageorgiou et al. ) . European ICZM has received similar criticism, with additional suggestions that overly complex national frameworks have proved ' difficult and confusing' to implement at the local level, resulting in inconsistent and sometimes largely symbolic outputs within countries and regions (Bridge and Salman ) .
Explaining convergence and divergence in NRNGA processes and outcomes
Figure  suggested four possible trajectories of ICZM and NFP policy development based on a distinction between substantive and procedural elements and the exact mix of each found in each strategy. In both cases, the professional communities of coastal zone and forest management experts have reinforced these distinctions in their own discourse and practice. Thus, the Noordwijk guidelines identified a series of key principles that have remained the cornerstone of contemporary ICZM. They include a focus on intersectoral coordination rather than traditional sector-by-sector management; holistic, multidisciplinary ecosystem-based planning; a dynamic, continuous, evolutionary and iterative attempt to solve complex problems; and the creation of new governance structures to accommodate meaningful stakeholder participation and conflict resolution (Post and Lundin ). The constitutive elements of an NFP noted by European researchers are almost identical: they are expected to be holistic, iterative, promote intersectoral coordination, and enable conflict resolution (Glueck ) . They are expected to be different from the traditional regime of regulation and subsidies for commodity production traditionally found in the forestry sector. That is, in addition to traditional industry supply, production regulation and market promotion activities, these new resource governance strategies also contain elements that introduce holistic ecological goals and encourage forms of autopoetic network management.
Lacking binding legal direction from either an international convention or an EU Directive, we would expect the development of ICZM and NFPs to be strongly marked by national differences, resulting in NRNGAs that can be distinguished across the two dimensions of Figure  . There will be those that use formal processes of participation and conflict resolution, embodied in national legislation and policy and those that rely on informal, ad hoc, and local processes. On the other dimension, we should encounter those where the plans actually deliver the key outputs of coordination and policy learning among actors in a manner which alters policy discourses and actions and those that do so only in a token or symbolic sense with little actual impact on actor behaviour.
What is of interest here is not the mere fact of national-level divergence, but understanding its causes and, hence, the possibility of arriving in the virtuous upper half of Figure  , avoiding merely symbolic and rhetorical outcomes. Following a number of suggestions in the literature on new modes of governance, we propose that the kind of NGA that ultimately emerges depends on the interaction of private and public governance capacity in the various sectors that an integrated strategy is attempting to coordinate (Knill and Lehmkuhl ) . While some public capacity in the form of a competent lead agency with clear strategic mandate or institutionalized role towards inter-and intragovernmental coordination is helpful, the holistic and intersectoral nature of new governance arrangements means that the key strategic capacities are to be found in non-government actors, particularly where there is a strong civil society interest in the key issues and a tradition of consultation and involvement. This general model is set out in Figure  .
Specific European cases provide exemplars of each type of NRNGA. In the case of ICZM, the United Kingdom shows the classic combination of strong public capacity in coastal zone management, especially after the recent devolution of powers to Scotland, with well-organized private sector interests in a culture of collaboration and compromise (Stead ) . While funding of local initiatives remains a perennial problem, affecting both public and private capacities and leading to charges that ' ICZM (is)being conducted on the cheap' (Stead and McGlashan : ), the extensive use of voluntary partnerships has set key elements in place. Germany illustrates a common combination in many European countries where strong public capacity, organized in this case at the Lander level, is not matched by a culture of consultation. Interests are organized from above and public awareness of coastal problems is low (Pickaver : ). Though much is achieved in the coastal zone, it is not as the outcome of strategic ICZM. The danger of this particular combination of private and public capacities is the opportunity it offers for traditional consumptive interests to maintain an advantageous status quo. Denmark offers another common pattern, where very extensive decentralization weakens public capacity but this weakness is compensated for by the capacities of both corporate and third sector interests to deliver substantive outputs (Anker et al ) . There are significant outputs but not national ICZM. Greece, on the other hand, shows the Mediterranean pattern of a general lack of capacity to engage in complex strategic policy coordination, but where relatively small changes, such as improving the local administration's role in delivering sustainable development will constitute a significant improvement on the ground (Sevastaki and Kalamaras ).
Examples of the four variants can also be found amongst NFPs and confirm the relationship between the different variants and the F . Expected configurations of NRNGAs (following Knill and Lehmkuhl) configuration of public and private governance capacities ( Figure ) . The German NFP provides an interesting example of the classical NRNGA. Initially, it appeared that the German NFP would take the same route as German ICZM, with heavy-handed state management of the process excluding civil society actors and aiming at a legitimization of the status quo. Instead, the involvement of Land governments where the influence of the forest industry is weak or negligible, the rather exposed position that the federal government had taken in international negotiations on forest sustainability and the consequent mobilization of German ENGOs around forestry issues combine to force the process open and create something like the ideal configuration of NFP process and substance (Elsasser and Pretzsch ) . In Finland, on the other hand, where the forest industry remains economically and politically important and state involvement is dominated by a powerful lead agency with a traditional forestry focus, the NFP became essentially an exercise in legitimating existing practices (Hanninen et al. ) . Sweden, with its large forest products industry balanced by well-organized forest owners associations and a highly decentralized public administration provides an example of the ' output oriented' NFP, where substantive outputs are achieved without a formal integrated strategy. Italy, on the other hand, where forestry has been bombarded with planning instruments but strategic F . Exemplary European NFP and ICZM types direction remains ' characterized by weak reciprocal coordination and by a sectoral vision of territorial management' (Carbone and Venzi : ) is another Mediterranean example of a rhetorical effort at integration.
Internationalization and capacity change as factors affecting the development of new governance arrangements
NFPs and ICZM are both instances of ' next-generation' policy instrument mixes or ' natural resources new governance arrangements' adopted as part of a common response on the part of national governments to the weak internationalization of forest and coastal zone policy issues. In both cases, NGAs are being proposed as a response to decades of piecemeal adjustment, layering and drift that have combined to create a patchwork of overlapping and ambiguous regulations and perverse incentives.
In one sense, the story of the European experience with NFPs and ICZM is a familiar one: they are examples of convergence on a common ' new governance' solution to government capacity loss caused by globalization in the absence of a robust international regime. It is no surprise that smaller countries with significant exposure to global markets in the relevant policy sector should be at the forefront of NRNGA development. This new ' governance' relationship, in which states attempt to steer loose networks of private and public actors towards common policy goals emerged in the context of a new, internationalized ' free-trading', environment which has restricted states' ability to control national actors involved in international commodity production and exchange and where the complexity of the issues make narrow sectoral regulation of dubious benefit.
In neither case is there a strong international regime. In the coastal zone, the decades-long saga of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) created binding international law on property rights and jurisdiction, but left the international community with little appetite for further development of environmental management objectives. In the forestry case, there have been three failed attempts to negotiate a binding international convention on forest protection and management over the past twenty years, but significant convergence on international norms of sustainable forest management (SFM) (Humphreys  and ) . These norms have been expressed in a growing movement for third party certification of ' sustainable' forestry, and in government-sponsored regional initiatives to develop criteria and indicators of SFM to guide policy development, reporting, and benchmarking. In both cases, several important international conventions are indirectly relevant to forest and coastal zone management, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the Ramsar Convention on the conservation of wetlands.
Unable to conclude negotiations that would remove their traditional regulatory approaches to the level of binding international conventions, governments searched for new mixes of policy instruments that could be effective in the new environment. Many of these instruments attempt to alter incentive structures in order to motivate private actors to pursue public purposes without close regulatory supervision. The various forms of self regulation backed up by the threat of closer supervision for persistent laggards are examples of this approach, but all these efforts usually also involve additional instruments for participation, consultation and conflict resolution (Gunningham and Sinclair ) .
It is certainly true, first, that the overall picture is one of convergence on a new kind of policy style and, second, that internationalization of issues that were once comfortably handled domestically by traditional sectoral policy making posed a general problem for which NGAs are a common solution.
It is clear, however, from the empirical record of the European NFP and ICZM experience that different types of NRNGAs exist. While the overall goals and objectives of the NRNGAs are similar and convergent, significant national differences exist in the types of NRNGAs adopted in each country. What explains these divergences?
Noting the link between the development of extensive transnational markets and public sector capacity loss, Coleman and Perl have observed that experiments with new forms of governance increasingly involve partnerships with private actors operating in these markets as producers, retailers or even consumers (Coleman and Perl ) . Both the NFP and ICZM NRNGAs in Europe can be seen as partnership strategies which have emerged as the outcome of domestic policy-making in the context of very weak international regimes. In fact, they are to a great extent a domestic substitute for a more ambitious attempt to create a strong international regime based on legally-binding conventions and strong international institutions Without the convergence pressures that strong internationalization creates, local peculiarities assert themselves, so that we see divergences in national behaviour even as NRNGAs are being formulated.
While forestry and forest products industries remain significant economic drivers in parts of the EU, their economic and political importance is generally declining, and the problem of integrating forestry with alternative, non-consumptive forest uses has become a key issue. In most parts of the European coastal zone, the general decline of the once-dominant coastal fishing industry is partly balanced by the development of a new industry -aquaculture -which often conflicts with traditional fisheries and various kinds of tourism and recreation. Thus, for both NRNGAs, because of the differential impact of private sector declines in different countries -and in some cases the appearance of new industries to compensate -rather different governance relationships have emerged in different countries, and the solutions put forward have varied widely in spite of pressures for convergence at the international or supranational levels. The European examples have shown that the substantive or symbolic nature of the mechanisms adopted for co-ordination and learning can be seen to be a function of the degree to which third sector actors are active vis à vis traditional private sector groups (Gulbrandsen ; Kissling-Naf and Bisang ).
These two cases reveal that the overall pattern thus far in Europe is one of at best only limited convergence towards the adoption of ICZM and NFPs as substantive new governance arrangements. Convergence on experimentation with integrated strategies combines with quite striking divergences in national approaches to ICZM and NFPs and some highly significant differences in the achievement of substantive policy outputs from country to country. Our examples, hence, support Briassoulis's conclusion that ' in the absence of substantive integration among policies in terms of their theoretical and conceptual framing and value orientations, an instrumental, procedural-oriented approach to PI [policy integration] will not deliver PI, at least in the long term (Briassoulis b: ) .
This first conclusion has important implications for the study of policy convergence. In these cases, at least, a complex, uneven, multi-stage process exists in which states converge on similar policies by experimentation in response to similar (weak) international pressures; they engage in policy emulation in an attempt to coordinate these experiments into an integrated strategy or new governance arrangement, creating further convergence; but domestic factors intervene to cause significant divergence in the production of substantive policy outputs even where, on the surface, states appear to have converged on the same new governance arrangement.
Our examples also suggest the main mechanism that is responsible for this pattern of ' divergence within convergence' relates to different national state and NGO capacity configurations. Successful new governance arrangements require a careful, context-sensitive balance of public and private actors. As our examples show, private governance capacity can, to some extent, substitute for public capacity in steering towards policy goals. These private capacities include data-gathering, information-sharing and general facilitation of policy learning, together with the ability to negotiate and oversee voluntary agreements between corporate actors and between corporate actors and third sectors actors such as ENGOs or community organizations. Both NFPs and ICZM have made extensive use of these kinds of private governance capacities to achieve substantive outputs. However, as our examples also show, heavy-handed attempts to manipulate policy networks in a top-down fashion can quickly negate the benefits of new governance arrangements by driving out civil society actors.
 Given that new governance arrangements arise from the need to use private capacities to compensate for the growing ineffectiveness of traditional governing instruments in achieving integration, the danger remains that poorly designed strategies may sometimes only put an integrative gloss on an existing sectoral policy.
NOTES
. The division of policy components into four types originates in Peter Hall's () distinction between policy goals and two types of ' means': policy instruments and their calibrations or ' settings'. Distinguishing between abstract goals and more ' practical' objectives is also useful. See Howlett and Ramesh () and Cashore and Howlett (). . As Gunningham and his colleagues have pointed out, the development of NGAs often involves adopting a specific set of policy design principles to help compensate for the loss of traditional governing capacities driven by changes in domestic or international spheres (Gunningham and Sinclair ). . Though adopted at the  conference, the guidelines were subsequently revised and published in the Bank's ESD Monograph series as Post and Lundin (). . On the other hand, none of our examples of integrated strategies with substantive outputs include arrangements that involve private actors only or where state actors appear in the guise of private actors without using authoritative instruments. Such arrangements would include so-called collaborative governance strategies (Imperial ) and private-interest government (Cashore et al. ) . This may be simply a feature of the examples that we have chosen or related to the well-known limitations of purely private governance (Lubell ) . In the cases of NFPs and ICZM, substantive outputs require at least the shadow of hierarchy and perhaps something more substantial from the authoritative side.
